September 18, 2025

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-23-005512 – DIAZ, MARLENE, vs FRALEY, REBECCA – Defendant’s Motion for Order Establishing Admissions and for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $2,860.00 – DENIED, without prejudice.

Proof of service demonstrates insufficient notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).)

CV-24-004195 – SP, JANE DOE vs HOUSE OF TYKES PRESCHOOL INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order Implementing a “First Look” Procedure – DENIED.

No separate statement was provided with the motion. The Court nonetheless chooses to proceed on the merits.

Plaintiff alleges substantial abuse causing both physical and emotional injuries. Plaintiff asserts a right of first review of medical records prior to release and suggests that privacy interests outweigh the probative value of some portion of the medical records.

Plaintiff argues that there is no time limitation, but the alleged events occurred when Plaintiff was a small child. Plaintiff’s lifetime medical history may well be relevant, and Plaintiff has put her physical and emotional condition at issue in this case. Under Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4 ^th 1 the allegations made put Plaintiff’s physical and mental state at issue.

Plaintiff’s request for a “first look” procedure is unsupported by any specificity of records sought to be redacted. Virtually any psychological information would be relevant given Plaintiff’s age. It is possible that there is some physical issue which is irrelevant, but Plaintiff does not allude to what that might be at all in the original motion.

Plaintiff’s citation to Manela v. Superior Court (2009) 188 Cal.App.4 ^th 1139 is inapposite. In that case, the party did not tender the issue as required to waive privilege. In this case, Plaintiff has tendered these issues.

UD-25-000872 – GILL, PARMINDER vs SOHAL, RAMANDEEP K – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-22-005673 – WORTHINGTON, SUSAN vs CREATIVE ALTERNATIVES – Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class and PAGA Settlement  – GRANTED, and unopposed.

It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court’s order granting preliminary approval on May 16, 2025. Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting and supplemental declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law.  (Civil Code §1781; Code Civ. Proc. §382; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769.) 

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motion and supporting papers, as follows:

        Fees and Costs of Settlement Administrator: $6,950

        Payment to Class Representatives: $10,000 (each)

        PAGA allocation to LWDA (75%) and class members (25%): $50,000

        Class Counsel’s Costs: $23,369.50

        Class Counsel’s Fees: $257,500

The Court orders that a statement of disbursement be filed on or before May 26, 2026, and the Court sets the matter for a compliance hearing on June 17, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

In addition, the Court orders that notice of the Court’s order granting final approval and judgment shall be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website for a period of at least 90 days.  (Civ. Code §1781(g); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.771(b).)

Class Counsel shall submit a revised proposed order incorporating the above.

CV-23-003496 – PANIAGUA, BRIAN vs CITY OF NEWMAN – Defendant City of Newman’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant City of Newman’s (“City”) motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Background

This is a personal injury case that began on 2/26/23 with the filing of a complaint by Brian Paniagua against the City of Newman (as well as other government entities who are not relevant to this motion). Plaintiff claims that, on or about July 3, 2022, he was lawfully on the premises of Sherman Park located in Newman, CA, and playing soccer on the open grass area of the subject premises when he stepped into a hole and/or uneven portion of the grass area. The defect caused Plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries. The complaint contains one cause of action, for premises liability.

Grounds for Motion

The motion is based on the following grounds:

         “(1) The City is entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that the undisputed material facts establish that the condition of public property upon which Plaintiff claims to have sustained injury was trivial as a matter of law;

        “(2) The City is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed material facts establish that the City did not possess actual notice of the allegedly dangerous condition upon which Plaintiff claims to have sustained injury;

         “(3) The City is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed material facts establish that the City did not possess constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition upon which Plaintiff claims to have sustained injury; and

         “(4) The City is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed material facts establish that the condition of public property upon which Plaintiff claims to have sustained injury was caused by an act or omission of the City employee.” [ Sic .]

The Court notes that the last stated ground is procedurally defective because the notice of motion and motion mistakenly state that the “condition … was caused by an act or omission…” (emphasis added) instead of stating that the condition was not caused by an act or omission of a City employee.

Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact….” ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” ( Id. , at p. 851.) A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies its initial burden by proving either that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense. ( Ibid .) In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the moving party's affidavits are strictly construed while those of the opposing party are liberally construed. ( Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575.) The facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom must be accepted as true. ( Ibid .)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” ( Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. ( Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc . (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. ( Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp . (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

Government Premises Liability Elements

Under California law, a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes the following elements:

        1. The property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury;

        2. The injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition;

        3. The dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury incurred; and

        4. Either:

             - A negligent or wrongful act or omission of a public entity employee created the dangerous condition, or

             - The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time before the injury to take protective measures.

(See Gov’t Code, § 835.)

A “dangerous condition” is defined as “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov’t Code, § 830(a).)

Trivial Defect Doctrine and Application

A condition is deemed to be “minor, trivial, or insignificant” in nature “if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov’t Code, § 830.2.)

“The trivial defect doctrine is not an affirmative defense. It is an aspect of a landowner's duty which a plaintiff must plead and prove. [Citation.] The doctrine permits a court to determine whether a defect is trivial as a matter of law, rather than submitting the question to a jury. [Citation.]” ( Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567.)

Although most courts use a two-step analysis to determine whether a defect is trivial as a matter of law, the Fifth Appellate District has rejected that approach and instead favors “a holistic multifactor framework for assessing triviality….” ( Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 114 ( Stack ), reh'g denied (May 22, 2023), review denied (July 26, 2023) .) The most important factor is the defect’s size. (See id ., at p. 111.) And then, “[b]eyond size, additional factors courts typically consider in assessing a … condition's triviality as a matter of law are: the nature and quality of the defect …; whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect …; the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; whether the defect has caused other accidents; and plaintiff's familiarity with the area.” (Id., at p. 115.)

There is no evidence presented in conjunction with this motion that indicates the exact defect at issue—i.e., the one that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s injury—was ever identified post-accident. The only evidence of the size of the defect is Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff described the defect as “ ‘reasonably sized’ and ‘big’ in an uneven area. The hole was large enough for Plaintiff’s heel to be lower than the top of his foot.” (Opp. SUF No. 7.) On summary judgment, the Court does not weigh credibility and accepts Plaintiff’s description of the defect as undisputed.

The nature of the defect is that it was either a hole or depression in an uneven area in a soccer field. The fact that there is no evidence indicating the specific defect was ever identified post-accident leads to the following possible inferences: (1) the defect was a natural land feature that self-corrected through erosion or other means; (2) the defect was so minor, it could not be identified post-accident; or (3) the defect was corrected by either the City’s landscaping company or animal defense management company, but this correction was not reported to the City.

As to other factors that the Court must consider, it is undisputed that the defect at issue was concealed by grass. (See SUF No. 8.) It is also undisputed that Plaintiff was unfamiliar with the area and the field, and the accident occurred relatively quickly—i.e., within five minutes—after Plaintiff engaged on the field. (See AUM Nos. 9-11.) It does not seem that lighting or weather played a role in the accident, as it occurred in July. (See SUF No. 1.) There are no other known reports, lawsuits, or complaints regarding the defect at issue. (See SUF Nos. 9-15, 24-26, 28-34.)

Given the above factors, the Court finds that it is highly unlikely that a reasonable jury could “conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov’t Code, § 830.2.) But the standard on summary judgment is not whether something is likely or unlikely. Rather, it is whether “ no reasonable person” could reach this conclusion. (See id. [emphasis added].) And the Court is of the position that it cannot, based on the evidence before it and considering the applicable summary judgment standards, make this finding as a matter of law. Much would depend on the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony describing the defect, which, as the Court noted above, is not a factor it can weigh on summary judgment.

The Procedural Defect Regarding the Fourth Ground Precludes Any Other Basis for Summary Judgment

If the Court does not find that the defect at issue is trivial as a matter of law, then, on summary judgment, the Defendant must negate both of the following possibilities: (1) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a public entity employee created the dangerous condition, or (2) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time before the injury to take protective measures. (See Gov’t Code, § 835.) As the Court noted above, there is a procedural defect in the fourth stated ground for the motion. Because of this defect, the Court is precluded from finding in Defendant’s favor on this issue. Given that fact, it cannot grant summary judgment on the alternative ground that neither of the elements set forth in Government Code § 835(a) or (b) are satisfied.

Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff filed objections to declarations that Defendant filed in support of the motion. However, the disputed evidence is immaterial to the Court’s ruling. Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on the objections. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

CV-24-005247 – HOLLANDS, CORY vs ENVIRO TECH CHEMICAL SERVICES INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Conditional Certification, Approval of Class Notice, Setting of Final Approval Hearing Date – GRANTED, and unopposed

The Court finds the proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and subject to final approval by this Court. 

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the class is certified for settlement purposes only in accordance with rule 3.769(c) of the California Rules of Court. The class counsel, class representative, and settlement administrator are hereby preliminarily approved and appointed as set forth in the motion.

The Court finds the schedule set forth in the settlement agreement acceptable. The Court intends to sign the proposed order.

A final fairness hearing in this matter shall be set for March 18, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22 of this Court.

CV-25-001300 – JONSON, AMANDA vs AMAN, MUAZZUM, MD – a) Defendant Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, INC.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint - OVERRULED. b) Defendants Robert Perkins, M.D., and Modesto Radiology Medical Group, INC.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Damages - OVERRULED.

a) – b)

Legal Standard

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) “The complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.” ( Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517, as modified (Feb. 28, 2001) .)

Relation-Back

Both sets of Moving Defendants are demurring to the second cause of action in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the basis that the claim does not relate back to the original complaint and is barred by the statute of limitations.

The original complaint contained two causes of action, the first entitled, “Professional Negligence,” and the second entitled, “Loss of Consortium.” The FAC also contains two causes of action, but now the first is entitled, “Negligence/Wrongful Death,” and the second is entitled, “Negligence/Survivor Claim.”

Under California law, survivor actions and wrongful death actions are distinct legal remedies that address different injuries and fall under separate statutory provisions.

A survivor action is governed by Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30. “Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30 provides: ‘A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest ... and an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest.’ A survivor claim is a claim asserted on behalf of the victim or decedent. [Citation.]” ( Brenner v. Universal Health Services of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 589, 605.)

In contrast, a wrongful death cause of action is an independent right belonging to the personal representative or successors-in-interest of the decedent. Wrongful death actions are governed by California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 et seq. The purpose of a wrongful death cause of action “is to compensate specified persons—heirs—for the loss of companionship and for other losses suffered as a result of a decedent's death.” ( Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263.)

A plain reading of the original complaint shows that both injury to the decedent (as well as injury to the surviving spouse) was alleged in that pleading. Specifically, paragraph 50 in the complaint stated, “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Zachary has suffered general and special damages in an amount to be proved at trial.” (Emphasis added.) The injuries were based on the same underlying events. It is further noted that the original complaint was filed by Plaintiff “individually and as Representative of the Estate of Zachary O. Jonson.” (See Compl., at caption and at p. 1, preliminary statement.) It is also noted that the original complaint stated it was for, inter alia, “Medical Malpractice” (see Compl., at caption) or “Professional Negligence” (see Compl., First Cause of Action)—in other words, for a cause of action belonging to the decedent.

The required elements for both a survivor cause of action and a wrongful death cause of action were thus present in the original pleading. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants’ relation-back argument unpersuasive.

Successor-in-Interest Arguments by the Radiology Defendants

In addition to demurring based on the statute of limitations, Defendants Robert Perkins, M.D., and Modesto Radiological Medical Group, Inc. (“Radiology Defendants”) demur to the FAC on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff has inadequately pleaded her status as the representative of the estate of the decedent, or alternatively, has failed to file a successor-in-interest declaration; and (2) Plaintiff “is not a licensed California attorney and cannot represent decedent's Estate to pursue his survivor claim.” (Mem., at p. 8.)

The Court finds no merit in either argument. Plaintiff states in the FAC that she is “the lawful Representative of Zachary’s estate.” (FAC ¶ 2.) On demurrer, the Court takes as true all allegations in the complaint. Such an allegation is adequate for the purpose of demurrer. (See Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104–105, disapproved of on inapposite grounds by Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1106 [“Indeed, ‘we accept as true even improbable alleged facts, and we do not concern ourselves with the plaintiff's ability to prove [the] factual allegations.’ [Citations.]”].) It is further noted that Plaintiff filed a successor-in-interest declaration on July 14, 2025, so to the extent that there was a defect in her standing (in that she perhaps is not yet the appointed personal representative of the decedent’s estate), that defect has now been cured.

As for the Radiology Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff cannot represent the decedent’s estate to pursue her survivor claim” because she is not herself a licensed attorney, both the FAC and the original complaint state that counsel of record are the attorneys for “Plaintiffs,” meaning Ms. Jonson in both her capacities.

Answers

Moving Defendants to answer within the next 10 days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

***There are no Tentative Rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-19-000134 – DISCOVER BANK vs PABUSTAN, DIOMEDES – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Amending Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc (Amended Judgment); [C.C.P. 473] – GRANTED.

Good cause existing, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted.

The Court’s judgment dated December 30, 2021 is hereby amended nunc pro tunc to award Plaintiff  judgment in the principal amount of $11,151.99, costs in the amount of $594.97, which includes filing fees of $370.00, service of the complaint in the amount of $69.50, e-filing fees in the amount of $35.47, and motion fees in the amount of $120.00 for a TOTAL JUDGMENT 0f $11,151.99.  (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 187 and 473 (d); Phillips, Spallas & Angstadt, LLP v. Fotouhi (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1132; Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal. App. 5 ^th 832).

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is granted. ( Evidence Code § 452 (d)).

CV-23-000791 – ALVAREZ, TOMAS vs SCI SHARED SERVICE INC – Defendant Brightview Landscape Services, INC.’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED, unopposed.

The Court finds on a review of the evidence and testimony adduced by Defendant Brightview Landscape Services that no triable issue exits as to any material fact herein relating to Defendant’s legal duty of care, breach of that duty and proximate cause resulting in injury to Plaintiff. (Civ. Proc . Code § 437(c);  Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co . (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1071; Hernandez v. Jensen , (2021) 61 Cal. App. 5 ^th 1056; D’s Exhibit A and C, P’s Deposition Testimony, Exhibit C, pp 16,   Exhibit D, p.19 ,and  Exhibit E, p. 21).

Summary judgment is therefore grantedin favor of Defendant Brightview Landscape Servies Inc.

CV-23-001227 – CARSON HYBRID ENERGY STORAGE LLC vs TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT – Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery – MOOT.

The Court finds that Defendant’s motion expressly states that the basis of the motion is to stay discovery pending the resolution of Defendant’s demurrer herein – “Carson’s Amended Complaint is barred by provisions of the Government Claims Act and the Unfair Competition Law, statutory immunities that have been granted to Turlock as a public entity by the California Legislature. Allowing discovery where a party is immune to suit effectively eliminates the protections provided by the immunity. Carson and the speedy resolution of this proceeding will not be prejudiced by the Court granting a stay of discovery until the Court can address Turlock’s demurrer. Additionally, the purpose of Carson’s Amended Complaint is to harass Turlock which the Court should not allow.” Having therefore addressed said demurrer, the Court finds that this motion is now moot.

As to Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request does not comply with the procedural requirements. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.040). Therefore, said request is hereby denied.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-25-000956 – GOLDEN HOMESTEAD LLC vs FIGUEROA, MATHEW – Demurrer – HEARING REQUIRED.