February 24, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no tentative rulings in Department 21***

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-007109 - GHASHEHKOSROV, DANYEL vs CSAA INSURANCE EXCHANGE - Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication - GRANTED in part and DENIED in part .

Background

Plaintiff filed this action on September 9, 2024, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) failure to proceed with arbitration, arising out of an uninsured motorist (“UM”) claim following a November 26, 2023 freeway rollover accident. (Def. UMF Nos. 1–3; Pl. UMF Nos. 2, 28.)

Defendant CSAA answered on September 11, 2025, generally denying liability and asserting affirmative defenses including arbitration and the genuine dispute doctrine. (Def. UMF No. 28.)

The insurance policy at issue provided UM/UIM coverage with limits of $300,000 and required arbitration of disputes concerning entitlement to benefits and the amount of damages. (Def. UMF Nos. 4–6; Pl. UMF No. 1.)

Plaintiff demanded UM arbitration and policy limits in April 2024. (Def. UMF Nos. 7–8; Pl. UMF Nos. 16–17.) CSAA investigated the claim, raised threshold UM issues typical of hit‑and‑run claims, and later accepted the claim for arbitration. (Def. UMF Nos. 9–13; Pl. UMF Nos. 18–21.)

The parties proceeded through arbitration, including discovery, depositions, expert medical evaluations, and motion practice. (Def. UMF Nos. 14–27; Pl. UMF Nos. 29–66.) The arbitration hearing occurred on February 13, 2025, and the arbitrator issued an award of $212,000 on February 24, 2025, which Defendant paid, including interest. (Def. UMF Nos. 45–49; Pl. UMF No. 67.)

Defendant filed the present motion on November 25, 2025.

Governing Standards

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.  (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” ( Id.  at p. 851.) A defendant meets their burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that “a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” ( Ibid .)  

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” ( Garcia v. World Savings, FSB  (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. ( Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc . (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. ( Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp . (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.) 

In addition to moving for summary judgment, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. 

Request for Judicial Notice

CSAA asks the Court to take judicial notice of court records, primarily, Plaintiff’s complaint and procedural filings relevant to arbitration and litigation history. Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453, the unopposed request is GRANTED.

Procedural Note Regarding Late-Filed Opposition

Plaintiff’s opposition was filed one day late. In a declaration filed by Plaintiff’s counsel, Attorney Seuthe explains that his office experienced a major technical failure. The Court exercises its discretion to consider the opposition, as the delay was minimal and Defendant has not shown prejudice.

Discussion

Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication, is DENIED as to summary judgment because the second cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages remain for trial.

Defendant’s request for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of contract is GRANTED. The Court distinguishes breach of contract from breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A breach of contract requires nonperformance of a contractual obligation, whereas the implied covenant may be breached by conduct that frustrates the other party’s rights to the benefits of the agreement. (See Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1393–1395.) The undisputed facts establish that the UM dispute proceeded through arbitration, an award issued, and Defendant paid the award and interest; therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish contractual nonperformance. (Def. UMF Nos. 45–49; Pl. UMF No. 67.)

Defendant’s request for summary adjudication of the third cause of action for failure to proceed forward with arbitration is GRANTED. To the extent the claim seeks contractual performance under a different label, it is duplicative of the contract theory under the primary-rights framework. (See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 904–905.) In any event, the claim is moot because the parties completed arbitration and the Court cannot grant effectual relief. (See Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132–133; Def. UMF Nos. 45–47; Pl. UMF No. 67.)

Defendant’s request for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is DENIED. Triable issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of Defendant’s investigation and delay, including disputes regarding whether Defendant genuinely lacked substantiation when it asserted that rationale and whether a bona fide threshold coverage dispute existed when raised, in light of early claim notes and physical-contact indicia referenced in the Separate Statements. (Def. UMF Nos. 9–12; Pl. Resp. to Def. UMF Nos. 10–12; Pl. UMF Nos. 9–10, 12–15, 37.) Under Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 723–724, summary adjudication is improper where a jury could reasonably find the insurer acted without a good faith investigation and without a reasonable basis for a genuine dispute.

Defendant’s request for summary adjudication of punitive damages is DENIED. As the California Supreme Court explained in Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 52, summary judgment shall not be granted “based on inferences reasonably deducible from such evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” When a defendant moves for summary judgment, that defendant “has the burden of negating every alternative theory of liability presented by the pleadings.” ( Bonus-Bilt, Inc. v. United Grocers, Ltd. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 429, 438; Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 768, 772.)

Here, Defendant’s presentation would require the Court to weigh competing inferences on malice/oppression/fraud and corporate culpability, which is improper. (See Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) A reasonable trier of fact could reach either conclusion depending on how it resolves disputed facts and inferences, including disputes bearing on the reasonableness of Defendant’s conduct. (See Def. UMF Nos. 9–12; Pl. Resp. to Def. UMF Nos. 10–12; Pl. UMF Nos. 9–10, 15.)

Proposed Order

Defendant to submit a proposed order in 10 court days consistent with this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

CV-23-001433 - VALLE, RIGOBERTO vs STANISLAUS FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY - Compliance Hearing - DROPPED.

Based on Mr. Brown’s declaration submitted 2-17-26, the Court finds that compliance has been demonstrated and no hearing is necessary. Class counsel shall prepare and submit an amended judgment directing that the amount of unclaimed settlement funds, plus any interest that has accrued thereon, shall be distributed to the cy pres organizations identified in the parties’ settlement agreement.(Code Civ. Proc. §384.)

CV-23-003465 - CASTILLO, MARIO vs STANISLAUS FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY - Compliance Hearing - DROPPED.

Based on Mr. Brown’s declaration submitted 2-17-26, the Court finds that compliance has been demonstrated and no hearing is necessary. Class counsel shall prepare and submit an amended judgment directing that the amount of unclaimed settlement funds, plus any interest that has accrued thereon, shall be distributed to the cy pres organizations identified in the parties’ settlement agreement.(Code Civ. Proc. §384.)

CV-23-004653 - MARTINEZ, VICTORIA vs STANISLAUS FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY - Compliance Hearing - DROPPED.

Based on Mr. Brown’s declaration submitted 2-17-26, the Court finds that compliance has been demonstrated and no hearing is necessary. Class counsel shall prepare and submit an amended judgment directing that the amount of unclaimed settlement funds, plus any interest that has accrued thereon, shall be distributed to the cy pres organizations identified in the parties’ settlement agreement.(Code Civ. Proc. §384.)

CV-23-007019 - ANDRES, REBECA BALBUENA vs STANISLAUS FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY - Compliance Hearing - DROPPED.

Based on Mr. Brown’s declaration submitted 2-17-26, the Court finds that compliance has been demonstrated and no hearing is necessary. Class counsel shall prepare and submit an amended judgment directing that the amount of unclaimed settlement funds, plus any interest that has accrued thereon, shall be distributed to the cy pres organizations identified in the parties’ settlement agreement.(Code Civ. Proc. §384.)

CV-24-000548 - SOHAL, MARTIN vs STANISLAUS FOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY - Compliance Hearing - DROPPED.

Based on Mr. Brown’s declaration submitted 2-17-26, the Court finds that compliance has been demonstrated and no hearing is necessary. Class counsel shall prepare and submit an amended judgment directing that the amount of unclaimed settlement funds, plus any interest that has accrued thereon, shall be distributed to the cy pres organizations identified in the parties’ settlement agreement.(Code Civ. Proc. §384.)

CV-24-004746 - HOWARD, CARRAY vs MODESTO SNF OPERATIONS LLC - a) Defendant Modesto SNF Operations LLC dba Hy-Lond Healthcare Center’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED, with leave to amend; b)Defendant Modesto SNF Operations LLC dba Hy-Lond Healthcare Center’s Motion to Strike Portions from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint - GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) The Court finds that the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress remains deficient as it appears in the Second Amended Complaint, in that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts constituting severe emotional distress as a result of their observations.

Plaintiffs shall submit their Third Amended Complaint within 20 days.

b) The Court finds that the Motion to Strike should be GRANTED as to the prayer for treble damages pursuant to Civ. Code § 3345. (SAC, page 11, line 10.)

CV-25-003490 - KEITH, KRISTIE ANN vs ALDEN PETERSON & SONS INC - a) Defendant State of California Department of Transportation’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint - OVERRULED; b)Defendant State of California Department of Transportation’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint - DENIED.

a) Procedurally, the notice/demurrer document is deficient in that it fails to set forth each ground of the demurrer in a separate paragraph stating whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specific causes of action or defenses. (Cal Rules of Ct 3.1320(a).)  Despite this procedural deficiency, the Court has exercised discretion to consider the substantive arguments herein. However, counsel is advised to follow the procedural requirements in future filings.

The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to support the stated causes of action.

b) Procedurally, the notice fails to comply with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1322, as Defendant fails to “quote in full the portions sought to be stricken,” and seems to improperly combine the asserted grounds for demurrer and motion to strike. Despite this procedural deficiency, the Court has exercised discretion to consider the substantive arguments herein. However, counsel is advised to follow the procedural requirements in future filings.

The Court is unconvinced by Defendant’s arguments and finds no legal basis to strike the subject material from the pleading at this stage.

CV-25-010909 - CAPITAL ONE NA vs ILLER, LUIS A - Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to DENY the motion, as Defendant’s self-serving declaration is insufficient to overcome the presumption of valid service pursuant to Evid. Code § 647.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-21-005695 - GHARRAEE, ZAHRA vs TRADER JOES COMPANY - a) Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees - DENIED; b)Defendant Trader Joe’s Company’s Motion to Strike & Tax Costs - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

a) The Court finds that the matters and issues contained in the Requests for Admissions at issue were of substantial importance.  ( Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, as modified, rehearing denied, review denied; Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014), 228 Cal.App.4th 729, modified on denial of rehearing, review filed, review denied.) 

However, the Court finds, given that said Requests for Admissions were propounded at the beginning of discovery, given the deposition testimony of Defendants’ employees and other percipient witnesses to the incident and or its immediate aftermath, as against Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff’s continued employment as a neonatologist for two more years following the incident, and the testimony of Defendant’s medical experts, that factual disputes as to liability and complex issues of causation were at issue so that it was reasonable for Defendants to possess a good faith belief that they would prevail at trial on the issues implicated by said Requests for Admissions. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2033.420; Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, as modified, rehearing denied, review denied; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, modified on denial of rehearing.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to her attorney fees as costs of proof.
(Civ. Proc. Code § 2033.420).

Defendant’s evidentiary objections are sustainedon the requested grounds.

b) To ensure a thorough review, this matter is continued on the Court’s own motion to April 3, 2026 at 8:30 am in Department 24of this Court.

CV-23-001880 - CARRILLO, ALFONSO MARTINEZ vs HERNANDEZ, JUAN - Defendant’s Petition to Amend Court Order re: Discovery Referee - GRANTED.

Good cause existing, the Court hereby amendsits order of August 6, 2025, appointing Hon. Stephanie Bowick as discovery referee in this matter for all purposes as follows:

Given Defendant Juan Hernandez’s demonstrated inability to pay his 25% share of the discovery referee’s fees, and upon the agreement of the parties to this matter, until further notice or otherwise ordered by the Court, the referee’s discovery fees herein shall be paid by Plaintiffs and Defendants Dairy Farmers of America in equal shares.

Should any issue subsequently arise involving Defendant Hernandez that requires the services of said discovery referee  the court shall address the issue at that time.

CV-25-002694 - CASTANEDA, FRANCISCO vs VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA INC - Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication - GRANTED.

The Court finds that the Magnusson Moss Magnuson Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act ( Magnusson-Moss Act)  does not create independent federal warranty rights. (15 US.C. §§ 2303(a)(1)-(2), 2304; Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC , (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322; Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co ., Inc., (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 82). Furthermore,  said § 2304’s refund and replace obligations attach only to full warranties.  ( Gusse v. Damon Corp . C.D. Cal. (2007) 470 F.Supp.2d 1110; Bollom v. Brunswick Corporation D.Minn.(2020)  453 F.Supp.3d 1206 Plaintiff’s claims, if at all, would be based on a limited warranty which does not support Plaintiff’s Magnusson Moss claims (15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1)-(2); Defendants’ SSUF No. 2; D’s Exh 2B to declaration of Martha Weir, Exh 2, USA Vehicle Warranty and Maintenance Booklet p. 9 ).

Claims under the Magnuson–Moss Act stand or fall with express and implied warranty claims under state law, as the Act borrows state law causes of action. (Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp ., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc ., 932 F.3d 811,(2019)). If a plaintiff's state warranty claims are preempted or otherwise fail, any express warranty claim under Magnuson-Moss is also fatal.  ( Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co ., (2002) 99 Cal.App.4 ^th 780; Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co ., Inc., (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824).

The Court finds that the undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff’s purchase of said vehicle was not accompanied by an express limited warranty. (Defendant’s SSUF No. 4; D’s Exhibits 1, 1A,  to Declaration of Chris Lewis, Exhibits 2 and 2B to declaration of Martha Weir, USA Vehicle Warranty and Maintenance Booklet p. 9 ). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state claims fail on this basis, as a result of which Plaintiff’s Magnusson Moss claims also fail. (Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp ., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc ., 932 F.3d 811,(2019); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co ., (2002) 99 Cal.App.4 ^th 780; Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co ., Inc., (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824).

Even if Plaintiff were able to satisfactorily establish the existence of an express or implied warranty regarding said vehicle, given Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust alternative dispute remedies prior to commencing this suit, any warranty claims would be barred. (15 U.S.C.A. § 2310; Defendant’s Exhibit 2,  Declaration of Sandra Weir, D’s Exhs.. 2, 2A and 2B). Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence establishing that Defendant’s said program is not federally compliant. ( 16 C.F.R. part 703)

As to Plaintiff’s cause of action for Violation of Business and Professions Code, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence supporting his claims and also failed to address Defendant’s contentions in this regard.   Furthermore, this cause of action is based on Plaintiff’s Magnusson-Moss Act claim which as above noted, fails.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. (Code of Civil Procedure section 437c)

Defendant’s objections to the declarations and Exhibits attached to the declaration of Ryan Marsden are sustained, based on lack of personal knowledge, and as inadmissible hearsay.  (Evid. Code, §§ 702, subd. (a); 1200, et seq.)

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-25-001366 - FERNANDEZ, ERICA vs BURNS, DONALD - Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and for Order Deeming Admitted Truth of Facts - HEARING REQUIRED.