July 11, 2025

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-001733 – KIRKSEY, KELLEE vs TILFORD, TOBY – a) Defendants’ Motion to Withdraw or Amend Deemed Admissions – GRANTED conditional on payment of attorney fees and costs for opposing this motion and for all discovery related to the withdrawn admissions, and providing a basis for denials; b)Plaintiffs’ Motion for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED in part; c)Motion for Leave to Amend the Second Amended Complaint – GRANTED.

HEARING REQUIRED to determine the trial date issue.

a) This is a close case.

The Court previously noted that under both Local Rule 1.14(I) and Rule 3.1110(f)(4) of the California Rules of Court, exhibits to declarations are to be bookmarked. When there are over 6,000 pages in the declarations, such bookmarks assist the Court.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300, subdivision (b), a court may permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions if it determines that the admissions were the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admissions will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining their action or defense on the merits. Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating substantial prejudice, which requires more than mere inconvenience or delay. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420-1421.) Any doubts in ruling on a motion to withdraw or amend admissions must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. ( Id. at p. 1420.)

Here, the defendants are Riverbank Rehabilitation Center, Dr. Gurpreet Randhawa, Ricardo Bautista, and Nazanin Nazmi. Dr. Randhawa ran the center, and the others were employees. They each assert that the failure to timely respond to requests for admission on this duty of care case is due to excusable neglect, and that no prejudice will accrue to Plaintiffs for the lack of timely completion of these.  

The timeline is as follows:

On June 10, 2024, the subject defendants answered the complaint while represented by attorney Zimmerman.

On July 9, 2024 Plaintiffs served the subject RFA’s.

In July 2024, Defense counsel left his prior firm and started his own firm.

On July 19, 2024 Defendant Nazmi signed a substitution of attorney subbing in attorney Zimmerman’s new firm.

On September 6, 2024, Defendant Bautista signed a substitution of attorney subbing in attorney Zimmerman’s new firm.

The RFA’s were due on November 8, 2024, after several extensions had been granted. The Zimmerman declaration does not definitively show that this was a clerical error, but given the standards these motions are governed by, the Court finds sufficient evidence to assume the missed deadline was a clerical error.

On January 16, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the defense a letter regarding the overdue responses. This appears to have alerted attorney Zimmerman as to the outstanding discovery. Nothing happened.

On January 28, 2025 Plaintiffs’ counsel sent another letter.

On February 4, 2025, defense counsel said that he had finished the interrogatories and RFA’s and was seeking verifications.

Attorney Zimmerman asserts in his initial declaration, without additional information, “Unfortunately, Defendants and their counsel were unable to serve completed responses before Plaintiffs filed motions to compel.”

On February 11, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel notified the defense that they had reserved motion dates for the RFA’s and other outstanding discovery. The motions were filed that day.

On February 17, 2025, paralegal Shantel Hernandez visited Nazmi’s home and left a note.

On March 13, 2025, defense counsel sent a letter with a list of personnel who Plaintiff alleges they had trouble reaching. Attorney Zimmerman says in the letter that a private investigator was hired to find Defendant Bautista and Defendant Nazmi. Also on March 13, 2025, on behalf of Defendants Riverbank Rehabilitation Center, Bautista, Nazmi, and Randhawa, said that locating former employees Nazmi and Bautista was difficult, that they had not stayed in contact and that a private investigator had been retained. Paralegal Shantel Hernandez had attempted to make contact with them. The lack of response by Riverbank and Dr. Randhawa is attested to be due to a failure to be able to obtain complete records.

On March 17, 2025, defense counsel noted he had reestablished contact with Defendant Bautista, who was then living in the Philippines.

From January to March of 2025, Mr. Zimmerman lost his sole senior associate and one of two legal assistants. A junior associate was hired.

On March 26, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion deeming the RFA’s admitted.

On April 25, 2025, defendant Riverbank provided verified responses to the RFA’s. Defendants Randhawa and Bautista provided unverified responses.

On May 16, 2025, defendant Nazmi provided verified responses to the RFA’s.

On May 22, 2025, defendant Randhawa provided a verification for the prior responses.

On May 28, 2025, defendants filed this motion.

On June 5, 2025, defendant Bautista provided verified responses.

Nazmi’s June 24, 2025 declaration asserts that she was fully employed as a nurse with Links Healthcare Group in January 2024, and was employed by the California Department of Public Health starting in July 2024. Nazmi asserted she traveled frequently from January to July of 2024, but there appears to have been no change of address. She asserted she was busy studying for a certificate from July 2024 to January 2025. In its earlier tentative ruling, the Court mistakenly asserted that the efforts to locate Nazmi were not in the 6,000 pages of documentation provided, but they were in fact included.

In supplemental briefing, a declaration by Shantel Hernandez, a paralegal, indicates that “the Legal Department” put in a help desk ticket to IT, presumably for Riverbank Rehabilitation. IT did not respond to a July 1, 2024 request and a September 2024 request and found no responsive documents from a December 2024 request.

There is no declaration from Bautista in this motion, nor in the supplemental briefing. 

The Court is unable to discern any change in status as to the available information to Riverbank and Randhawa from the November 8, 2024 date to the time they filed responses to the RFA’s.

ANALYSIS

Defendants claim that this is clearly excusable neglect. It is not clear to the Court.

Defendants cite to Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 227, 234-235 whose facts “parallel those at bar” as showing that a clerical failure is good cause for setting aside the deemed admissions. But what happened in Elston , under a different statutory process, is instructive.

In Elston, there was a failure to respond to RFA’s and the RFA issuer sent notice after 30 days that the RFA’s were deemed admitted. The attorney promptly moved to set aside the admissions noting turnover in his office and his own failure of awareness these were pending.

In this case, there was likely good cause not to deem the RFA’s admitted on or immediately after November 8, 2024. The Court accepts the declaration that this was a clerical error, and this explains the delay until the January 16, 2025 letter. This is neglect, but of the excusable sort.

Defendants proffer multiple federal cases in the supplemental briefing for the position that these effectively terminating sanctions should not occur. Defendants cite to:

Brook Village North Associates v. General Elec. Co . (1982) 686 F.2 ^nd 66. In this case the appellate court reversed a district court’s willingness to bypass admissions at trial.

Hadra v. Herman Blum Consulting Engineers (1978) 74 F.R. D. 113 had the 30-day deadline bypassed resulting in automatic admission while an employee was in Iran. Under those circumstances, the Court gave the Defendant an opportunity to justify their denials, and said it would deem unsupported denials admitted.

Defendants cite other federal orders and cases which would be helpful if the system were as it was federally in the 1970’s. But this circumstance is different; there was a noticed motion which went explained but unopposed. Answers were eventually provided

Defendants argue further that these RFA’s were posed in a manner in which only denials were likely. If that is so, where were the denials?

The Court is still baffled by the decisions made by Dr. Singh Randhawa and Riverbank not to provide any answers to these requests for admission. This is very, very close to quite inexcusable neglect. The failures in this case were acute and the supplemental briefing outlines problems in defense counsel’s office. The defense initially contended that the entire medical record was available to them prior to the initial deadline, and that there were not additional records since that time. They now say that substantially more medical records have been provided. The Court is concerned about the accuracy of the information it has received.

The Nazmi declaration indicates that although she was traveling and also busy, she was available. Her own declaration avoids details in asserting that it was only after it was impressed upon her the need to participate did she participate.

Defendant Bautista’s position would be stronger if it had some information on what happened between the time he signed the substitution of attorney and the March date when he reestablished contact. He was apparently in the Philippines and counsel provides portions of his deposition, but does not provide an actual declaration.

Defendants’ failures in this case are numerous and acute.

Here, defendants bypassed the initial due date, got extensions, bypassed that date, did not notice until January 2025, and did nothing until well after the Court issued a ruling deeming the RFA’s admitted in March. The Court must view the pleadings extremely generously to grant Defendant’s motion, and that is what I have done.

The Court does not believe Plaintiff has shown prejudice. Given the addition of a new party to this action and the extremely late interest shown by Defendants in this case, the Court believes any issues can be repaired via continuance or other actions. The Court is certainly open to other means of repairing any prejudice to Plaintiff.

Under Rhule v. WaveFront Technology, Inc . (2017) 8 Cal.App.5 ^th 1223, the Court has broad-based discretion to grant equitable relief to Plaintiff. The Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants and their counsel are jointly and severally ordered to pay costs and attorney fees for discovery related to the RFA’s. Plaintiff is provide a reasonably detailed estimate of costs and attorney fees involved between the date of filing of this motion on May 28, 2025 to July 11, 2025 in proving up issues addressed by the RFA’s by July 18, 2025.
2. The parties are to meet and confer to see if an agreement can be reached on current expenditures.
3. If not, Plaintiff shall file its request for fees with an outline of those fees incurred by July 25, 2025.
4. Defendant shall file any opposition to the amount of fees by August 1, 2025.
5. The Court will tentatively set a hearing on the fees for August 7, 2025. It is likely that fees will be ordered paid forthwith after the motion, and Defendants should be prepared to do so or the condition precedent to withdrawal shall not be met.
6. Plaintiff is also entitled to costs and attorney fees for efforts to prove issues implicated by the RFA’s in the future.
7. By July 19, 2025, Defendants shall provide a brief factual basis, inclusive of references to any documents implicated in those denials, for each denied RFA.

b) GRANTED in part.The Court will issue monetary sanctions according to proof for discovery violations. These should be non-duplicative and will not be heard with the other motion. As discovery is ongoing, the parties may wish to address this in post-trial or post-resolution proceedings. The Court notes that the absence of a separate statement in the original motion does not bar recovery, but impedes the Court’s ability to determine appropriate sanctions.

c) GRANTED. The Court is skeptical that a trial on the set date is possible with the new defendant. 

CV-25-004698 – LIMPOCO, MARIA DELORES vs CARTER, KIMBERLY – Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss - HEARING REQUIRED.

CV-24-005683 – DUCHESNE, AARON vs BATTEY, BETTY – Defendant Stewart Title of California, Inc.’s Motion for an Order Determining Good Faith Settlement - GRANTED, and unopposed.

The unopposed motion for a determination of good faith settlement is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(a)(1). The Court finds that the settlement was made in good faith and satisfies the standards set forth in  Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates  (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499. No evidence has been presented to suggest that the settlement was collusive, fraudulent, or otherwise unfair to non-settling parties. (See id ., at p. 502.)

Accordingly, all claims for equitable comparative contribution, partial or comparative indemnity, and similar theories of equitable apportionment against the settling defendants are barred. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(c).)

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion.

CV-25-003285 – DHILLON, JAGMOHAN vs UNDERGROUND LENDING LLC – Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction and Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED to July 16, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

Due to Department 22’s current unavailability, this matter is CONTINUED to July 16, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. The temporary restraining order is extended to that date.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

***The Civil tentative rulings for Department 22 are being heard in Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

CV-20-004662 – CHAR, FONG vs AMERICAN BUDGET INN - Defendant Navi Holdings, LLC’s Motion to Strike Doe Amendment, for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative, to Dismiss Defendant for Failure to Serve Summons, Delay in Prosecution or Failure to Bring Case to Trial Within Three Years - DENIED, without prejudice.

Proof of service is insufficient and does not comply with the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. § 1013b(a). In the absence of opposition, the Court cannot conclude that service was properly accomplished on Plaintiffs’ counsel. The proof of service for this motion is signed by an employee of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s office, but the proof of service indicates that service was actually made by OneLegal. If that is the case, OneLegal must submit the requisite information supporting appropriate service.

CV-22-002183 – CUSHING, ROBERT vs SIERRA NORTHERN RAILWAY – Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Trial on Liability for Inverse Condemnation Cause of Action - DENIED.

The Court is not convinced that trying the issue of Defendants’ liability for inverse condemnation concurrently with the trial of the preemption defense will serve the interests of justice and judicial economy herein. 

The Court’s ruling in this regard is made without prejudice to the parties’ ability to make a future request to bifurcate the trial of liability and damage issues in connection with the inverse condemnation claim, should the matter survive the preemption phase of the proceedings.

CV-22-003528 – KINGSLEY, ANDREW ROBERT vs WYNDHAM HOTEL MANAGEMENT INC – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment - DENIED.

Defendants, as the moving parties, have met the initial burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to judgment based on the submitted evidence.  The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to produce admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).)  Plaintiff has met his burden in this regard, demonstrating the existence of a material factual dispute on the issue of duty based on Defendants’ purported possession and/or exercise of control over the adjoining property where the allegedly dangerous condition existed. (See, at a minimum, UMF 9 and Plaintiff’s Additional Facts.)

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-22-002007 – VIDAL, CHARLES vs HOME DEPOT USA INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Home Depot USA, INC’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two; Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED as follows; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Home Depot USA, INC’s Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $3,210.00 Against Defendant and/or Counsel - GRANTED in part as follows.

a) The Court finds Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories Set Two No. 17.1 are not Code compliant. More specifically Defendant does not provide complete and straightforward responses to said form interrogatory and also impermissibly refers to substantive responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions Set One. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2030.220; 2030.300; Deyo v. Kilbourne, (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771).

Furthermore, to the extent Defendant raises and relies on objections to Plaintiff’s  Requests for Admissions, which the Court finds without merit, Defendant’s responses to Form Interrogatory 17.1 are also not Code compliant.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is hereby GRANTED.

Defendant shall provide further Code compliant responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two within fourteen (14)days of this order.

Monetary sanctions of $460 are imposed against Defendant for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing this motion. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.300).

b) The Court finds Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions properly include definitions of phrases used therein. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2033.060(e); California Rules of Court,  Rule 3.100).

The Court also finds Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, are not complete and straightforward, are evasive, include unmerited objections, impermissibly refer to other responses and are therefore not Code compliant ( Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2017.010, 2033.210 (b), 2033.220 (a) –(c) 2033.230; Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 429; Deyo v Kilbourne ( 1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is hereby GRANTED.

Defendant shall provide further Code-compliant responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One, within fourteen (14)days of the date of this order.  

Monetary sanctions of $1,600 are imposed against Defendant for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s reasonable fees and expenses incurred in bringing this motion.

CV-24-001934 – ORTEGA, EVA MENDOZA vs CHAVEZ, BLANCA – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Blanca Chavez to Provide Answers at Deposition, Provide Further Deposition, and Request for Monetary Sanctions – GRANTED.

The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to take Defendant Chavez’s deposition and that the items of enquiry by Plaintiff’s Counsel are discoverable . (Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2017.010, 2025.250; 2025.280(a), 2025.280; Slaieh v. Superior Ct. of Riverside Cnty . , (2022)77 Cal. App. 5th 266;   Tatkin v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 745; Brown v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1949) 34 Cal.2d 559; Williams v. Superior Ct. , (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531; Cruz v. Superior Ct., (2004)121 Cal. App. 4th 646). 

Taken as a whole, the discovery provisions governing depositions clearly contemplate that counsel not prevent deponents from answering a question unless it pertains to privileged matters or deposing counsel's conduct has reached a stage where suspension is warranted. ( Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency, Inc. , (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 1006).  Furthermore, suspension of a deposition is only warranted where the deposition questions venture into improper matters which reveal an underlying purpose to harass, annoy, or badger a deponent. ( Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency, Inc. , supra). The Court finds no such purpose from its review of the deposition transcript of Defendant Blanca Chavez’s deposition on January 31, 2025, and therefore finds that Defendant’s Counsel’s suspension of said deposition was unmerited and unfounded.

The Court also finds Defendant’s Counsel made a valid objection as to attorney client privilege and/or protected work product regarding the question of why Defendants were working on an Employee Handbook. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2025.460). However, Plaintiff’s question as to when Defendants decided they needed an Employee Handbook is merely a question about a date/time and a straightforward response thereto need not involve attorney client privileged material. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2025.460).  

The Court further finds Defendant’s Counsel made improper and impermissible speaking objections. ( Tucker v. Pac. Bell Mobile Servs ., (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1548; In re Marriage of Lemen (1980)113 Cal.App.3d 769.)

Plaintiff’s motion is accordingly GRANTED.

The parties shall meet and confer within the next fourteen (14) days and agree on a date and time for Ms. Chavez’s continued deposition on the topics and areas of enquiry identified in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement and reasonable follow-up questions. (Civ. Proc. Code 2025.450 (a)).

Defendant’s Counsel shall not improperly direct Ms. Chavez not to answer valid and relevant questions at said deposition, unless validly based on the assertion of the attorney client privilege.

Monetary sanctions of $4,214.45 are imposed against Defendant Chavez and her Counsel for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion and for a part of the costs incurred in said deposition. .(Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.010 (a), 2023.030, 2025 (g)(1) and 2025.480 (j); ( Tucker v. Pac. Bell Mobile Servs ., (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1548; In re Marriage of Lemen (1980)113 Cal.App.3d 769).

CV-24-004259 – UHG I LLC vs MENESES, EDWARD – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment, if Entered - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion to Thursday, July 23, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

The Court finds Defendant was not properly and validly served with Plaintiff’s summons and complaint herein and that good cause exists to set aside Plaintiff’s default taken herein.  (Code of Civil Procedure 473 (b), 473.5 and Civ. Code §1788.61).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings in Department 19***