November 22, 2024

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-000065 – GALVAN, ULISES vs NUNEZ, OSCAR – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Benito Jimenez Gutierrez’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set Two); Request for Sanctions – GRANTED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Benito Jimenez Gutierrez’s Further Responses to Requests for Admission (Set One); Request for Sanctions – GRANTED; c) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Benito Jimenez Gutierrez’s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One); Request for Sanctions – GRANTED; d) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Oscar Nunez’s Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set two); Request for Sanctions – GRANTED; e) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Oscar Nunez’s Further Responses to Requests for Admission (Set One); Request for Sanctions – GRANTED; f) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Oscar Nunez’s Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One); Request for Sanctions – GRANTED; g) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order Compelling Defendant Benito Jimenez Gutierrez’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Demands for Production (Set One); Request for Sanctions – DROPPED; h) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order Compelling Defendant Benito Jimenez Gutierrez’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Demands for Production (Set Two); Request for Sanctions – DROPPED; i)Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order Compelling Defendant Oscar Nunez’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Demands for Production (Set One); Request for Sanctions – DROPPED; j)Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Court Order Compelling Defendant Oscar Nunez’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Demands for Production (Set Three); Request for Sanctions – DROPPED.

One primary issue dominates these motions: Can Defendants avoid answering contention-type interrogatories and RFA’s because discovery has not been completed? The answer to this question is “no.”

Defendants both suggest that the case is insufficiently ripe to answer these questions. Defendants are mistaken; contention interrogatories are allowed ( Burke v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276) and Defendant is required to make rather more of an effort than here, where virtually no information is provided. The answer to RFA 30 is incomplete, while the other answers are essentially non-answers.

Defendants did not make a good faith effort to answer the questions. As Plaintiff points out, the amended response to RFA 19 which states “Admit that Defendant Oscar Nunez knows that driving while tired is dangerous,” is “as the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable responding party to admit to the matter.” It is difficult to see how this is so.

Defendants contend in part that any problems have been fixed. There were late-filed responses that cure some of the issues with Interrogatory 17.1 and other minor fixes. But in general, Defendants have stuck to their position that they need not answer the questions because they lack information. The answers thus far are insufficient.

Sanctions are issued at $760 per motion. Defendants’ contention that there is substantial justification for their actions – inclusive of sending amended responses only after these motions were made – lacks merit.

Even if Defendants had resolved all of the issues, sanctions would be appropriate. The Court has made prior discovery orders and the motion work was required.

The Court reminds the parties that discovery is supposed to be self-executing.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-20-000770 – VARGAS, AZUCENA vs DMB PACKING CORPORATION – Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the information presented in the moving papers and all other matters of record properly before the Court, and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule of Court 3.764, the Court grants the motion and will execute the proposed order Plaintiffs submitted defining the class as:

“All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of DMB Packing Corporation … and DiMare Enterprises, Inc. … in the State of California at any time during the period from February 4, 2016 through the date of the order granting class certification … .”

The Court will further certify the eight (8) sub-classes set forth in the motion.

The Court appoints Christopher Medina as Class Representative and Matern Law Group (including Matthew J. Matern, Esq., Joshua D. Boxer, Esq. and Sara B. Tosdal, Esq.) as Class Counsel.

CV-24-003049 – WESTERN HILLS WATER DISTRICT vs WORLD INTERNATIONAL LLC – Defendant’s Motion for an Order Staying Discovery and/or a Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending a Decision on Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration – GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court rules as follows: a stay of discovery is GRANTED under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4 as to any discovery directly concerning operational and capital costs. The motion for a stay is otherwise DENIED.

The Court is aware that Moving Defendants’ initial notice of motion and motion were based on “this Court’s inherent power to control discovery proceedings as well as Cal. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §§ 2017.020, 2019.020 and 2019.030 on the grounds that it is in the interest of justice and judicial economy to stay discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration.” But because the nature of the request read on Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4, the Court gave the parties the opportunity to brief that issue.

In its supplemental brief filed on November 1, 2024, Plaintiff relies on Leenay v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 553, for the proposition that a stay is not mandatory and does not apply to parties who are not signatories to the arbitration agreement. However, Leenay is inapposite. The procedural posture was different: there, the issue was not a stay pending a decision on an arbitration petition, but rather, a stay on the case after the court had already made an arbitration order. Furthermore, Leenay concerned the issue of whether, in six coordinated PAGA actions, a court could stay the cases of plaintiffs who were not signatories to arbitration agreements with the defendant Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC.

The Court acknowledges that, in this case, not all the Moving Defendants are parties to the purported agreement to arbitrate. However, Moving Defendants argue on reply that (1) Plaintiff impliedly concedes that a stay would be applicable to Defendant World International LLC, as it is a signatory to the Addendum; and (2) the stay should apply to the other Moving Defendants because “Plaintiff’s claims against each are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying contract obligations.” (11/8/24 Reply, at p. 4.)

Moving Defendants’ arguments on this point are well taken. The First Amended Complaint (FAC) filed on October 24, 2024, alleges, “At all times relevant hereto, Defendant THREE60 was the alter ego of WORLD. In addition, and alternatively, Guillermo MARRERO acted as the alter ego of WORLD as a principal (‘attorney in fact’) and/or in concert with the WORLD-THREE60 owners, members and managers as alleged herein.” (FAC, ¶ 4.) And Defendant Carmen Millan Kearney “is sued in her individual capacity and as a corporate officer representative-agent of WORLD and various other WORLD-related business entities, and as a financially interested person in WORLD and THREE60 business transactions.” (FAC, ¶ 10.) As for Defendant Douglas Kearney, he “is sued in his individual capacity and as a WORLD corporate officer representative-agent and a financially interested person in WORLD and THREE60 business transactions.” (FAC, ¶ 12.) Thus, the allegedly wrongful actions of the non-signatory Moving Defendants do appear to be largely intertwined with the actions of the signatory Defendant, World International LLC.

With that stated, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the scope of the arbitration agreement is limited to section 7 of the Master Agreement as amended, “Operational and Capital Costs.” (See FAC, pp. 50-53.) Although Moving Defendants argue in their motion to compel arbitration that section 7 subsumes the entire complaint, the Court reads section 7 more narrowly as including only those disputes directly relevant to operational and capital costs. Plaintiff contends that this would mean discovery should only be stayed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4 as to the fourth cause of action and that, accordingly, this is a severable issue. Moving Defendants do not directly refute this argument on reply. It appears to the Court that issues directly concerning operational and capital costs are definable in scope and can indeed be severed.

As for Moving Defendants’ original argument—that all discovery should be stayed because it is in the interest of justice and judicial economy—the Court finds it unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s pleading raises issues of serious concern for the public, and those concerns warrant prompt exploration.

PR-22-001183 – ESTATE OF NAPIER, TONNA – a) Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement – GRANTED, and unopposed; b) Order to Show Cause – GRANTED, and unopposed; c)Petitioner Roger Coggins’ Spousal Property Petition – GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

Roger Coggins has requested entry of judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement reached by the parties on September 16, 2024. The Court notes that the other heir to the estate, Nicholas Napier, who was not a signatory to the settlement agreement, filed a ratification of the agreement and consent on November 18, 2024. Accordingly, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6, the unopposed motion is GRANTED. The Court enters judgment accordingly.

b) Order to Show Cause

By minute order dated November 7, 2024, the Court set an Order to Show Cause (a) why the dismissal of the action with prejudice entered on September 30, 2024, should not be stricken; (b) why the Court should not instead enter a dismissal with prejudice solely of Ms. Napier’s petition, pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement; and (c) why the Court should not re-set the spousal property petition to calendar for November 22, 2024, at 8:30 am in Department 22.

As the Court noted in its minute order setting the Order to Show Cause, the dismissal of the entire action was a clear mistake; the settlement agreement called only for the dismissal with prejudice of Ms. Napier’s petition and contemplated the filing of a spousal property petition. As a result of the complete dismissal of the action, the spousal property petition was rejected.

To correct this error, the Court now rules as follows: no opposition to the Order to Show Cause having been received, the OSC is GRANTED in its entirety. The Court strikes the September 30, 2024 dismissal and instead enters a dismissal with prejudice nunc pro tunc as of September 30, 2024, solely as to Ms. Napier’s petition for probate. The spousal property petition previously rejected is set to calendar for November 22, 2024. The Court directs the clerk’s office to re-file a copy of the spousal property petition without strikethroughs.

c) Spousal Property Petition

The unopposed spousal property petition is GRANTED. The Court makes a community property finding. Half to be passed, half confirmed.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

CV-20-005404 – HAWKINS, BRANDON vs ONTEL SECURITY SERVICES INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and Paga Settlement – GRANTED, as modified below, and unopposed.

The Court finds the proposed settlement is within the range or reasonableness and deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and final approval by this Court. 

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the class is certified for settlement purposes only in accordance with Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.769(c).  The class counsel, class representative, and claims administrator are hereby preliminarily approved and appointed as set forth in the motion.

With regard to the requested disbursements from the gross settlement amount, the Court finds that the papers do not contain adequate support for the requested additional payment to Plaintiff Mendiola, which is described as compensation for her general release of claims relative to the matter.  First, the Court notes that the Settlement Agreement appears to impose a broader release against all named Plaintiffs as a group. (See Settlement Agreement, Section IIIC.) Additionally, even assuming Ms. Mendiola’s release is broader than the other representative plaintiffs named herein, the motion fails to demonstrate how the release of her individual claims warrants an additional $10,000 payment from the gross settlement herein.

The Court sets the following deadlines relative to this matter:

12-13-24	Defendant shall provide Class List and Data Report to Administrator
1010-25	Administrator shall mail Class Notice to Class Members.
2-24-25	Deadline for submission of Opt-Out Notice, Objections, or dispute their share of the settlement proceeds
3-19-25	Deadline for counsel to file motion for order of final approval

A final fairness hearing in this matter shall be set for April 11, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23 of this Court.  The Class Notice and proposed order shall be revised to reflect the information reflected herein, including the date of the final fairness hearing and the corresponding deadlines.

Lastly, the motion fails to demonstrate notice of the settlement to the LWDA; such notice shall be demonstrated at the time of the final fairness hearing.

CV-21-004743 – MODESTO SHERWOOD FOREST HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION vs HEANEY, PATRICK R – a) Plaintiff Modesto Sherwood Forest Home Owners Association’s Motion to be Awarded its Attorney’s Fees and Determined to be the Prevailing Party - GRANTED; b) Plaintiff Modesto Sherwood Forest Home Owners Association’s Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorneys’ Fees – GRANTED, in part.

a) The Court previously found that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as a result. (Civ. Code § 5975(c).) Therefore, the Court has considered the evidence provided, as well as the opposing arguments raised by Defendant herein.

The Court first notes that Defendant does not dispute the moving party’s entitlement to fees as the prevailing party, instead appearing to contest only the reasonableness of the hours claimed.  The successful party is normally entitled to a fully compensatory fee, which may be reduced only where special circumstances render the same unjust. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)

Hours Reasonably Worked –

The Defendant’s objections to Mr. Swedelson’s declaration are OVERRULED.

Regarding the lodestar fees calculation, the Court finds, based on the declarations of Mr. Savlov and Mr. Swedelson, that the hours claimed from the matter’s inception through July 2024, as set forth in the instant motion, are recoverable herein.

 Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for the time expended by counsel is GRANTED, as set forth below.

Reasonable Hourly Rates –

Of note, Defendant does not dispute the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed by the timekeepers herein. Moreover, the Court has considered the skill and experience of the timekeepers, the nature of the work performed, the customary billing rate for each timekeeper, and the prevailing rate for comparable legal services in the community.  ( Serrano v Unruh (Serrano IV) (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643; Serrano v Priest (Serrano III) (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.)  The Court itself has experience from his years in this civil law assignment reviewing and determining attorney fee motions with similarly situated and qualified counsel.   ( Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 49 [the "experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court”].)  Therefore, the claimed hourly rates are GRANTED, as set forth in the declarations of Mr. Savlov and Mr. Swedelson and summarized below.

S ummary of Award –

The Court’s lodestar calculation and award is set forth below. 

Timekeeper	Reasonable Hours Billed	Reasonable Hourly Rate	Subtotal
Savlov	98.10	280-300	28,872.00
Calvird	1.80	260	466.00
Pham	.50	190	95.00
Houtz	4.20	150	630.00
Anavisca	1.90	140-150	278.00
Subtotal			$30,341.00
Swedelson	404.00	425-475	182,375.00
Ryu	79.00	390-445	32,611.50
Lewis-Heard	25.00	435	10,788.00
Bonyadi	9.80	365	3,577.00
Rowe	2.70	460	1,242.00
Casaly	1.50	180	270.00
Kroncke	7.0	200	1,400
Gonzales	26.50	200	5,300.00
Subtotal			$237,563.50
		Total Award	$ 267,904.50

b) The Court previously found that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as a result. (Civ. Code § 5975(c).) Therefore, the Court has considered the evidence provided herein in support of Plaintiff’s request for a supplemental fee award related to matters that transpired after the filing of its original fee motion, as well as the opposing arguments raised by Defendant herein.

The Court first notes that Defendant does not dispute the moving party’s entitlement to fees as the prevailing party, instead appearing to contest only the reasonableness of the hours claimed.  The successful party is normally entitled to a fully compensatory fee, which may be reduced only where special circumstances render the same unjust. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)

Hours Reasonably Worked –

The Defendant’s objections to Mr. Swedelson’s declaration are OVERRULED.

Regarding the lodestar fees calculation, the Court finds, on the basis of Mr. Swedelson’s declaration, that the hours claimed from July through October 2024, as set forth in the instant motion, are recoverable with the exception of those time entries attributable to Plaintiff’s motion for relief from failure to submit a cost bill and Plaintiff’s preparation of supplemental evidence as directed by the court in connection with the original fee motion.  The time entries and amounts affected in this regard are as follows:

10-2-24 .85 hours ($170) billed by Ms. Gonzales related to the motion for relief.

10-7-24 .60 hours ($120) billed by Ms. Gonzales related to the motion for relief.

10-23-24 .80 ($368) billed by Ms. Bingham related to supplemental evidence requested by the Court on 10-15-25.

10-23-24 .50 ($237.50) billed by Mr. Swedelson related to supplemental evidence requested by the Court on 10-15-25.

10-25-24 1.30 ($260) billed by Ms. Gonzales related to supplemental evidence requested by the Court on 10-15-24.

In addition, the Court finds the $7,000 in “anticipated” fees claimed by counsel in connection with the preparation of a reply brief herein and attendance at the subject hearing to be excessive, particularly in view of the fact that no reply brief has been submitted.  Therefore, the Court approves the amount of $1,900, reflecting 4 hours of time billed at Mr. Swedelson’s hourly rate of $475, in this regard.

Subject to the above-referenced reductions, Plaintiff’s claim for the time expended by counsel is GRANTED, as set forth below.

Reasonable Hourly Rates –

Of note, Defendant does not dispute the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed by the timekeepers herein. Moreover, the Court has considered the skill and experience of the timekeepers, the nature of the work performed, the customary billing rate for each timekeeper, and the prevailing rate for comparable legal services in the community.  ( Serrano v Unruh (Serrano IV) (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643; Serrano v Priest (Serrano III) (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.)  The Court itself has experience from his years in this civil law assignment reviewing and determining attorney fee motions with similarly situated and qualified counsel.   ( Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 49 [the "experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court”].)  Therefore, the claimed hourly rates are GRANTED, as set forth in the declaration of Mr. Swedelson and summarized below.

S ummary of Award –

The Court’s lodestar calculation and award is set forth below. 

Timekeeper	Reasonable Hours Billed	Reasonable Hourly Rate	Subtotal
Swedelson	28.90	475.00	13,727.50
Luna	1.0	465.00	465.00
Ryu	39.50	445.00	17,577.50
Bingham	30.2	460.00	13,892.00
Gonzales	16.25	200.00	3,250.00
		Total Award	$ 48,912.00

CV-24-002359 – NORTHERN CALIFORNIA COLLECTION SERVICE INC vs ESPARZA, SAMUEL, MD – Plaintiff Northern Against Defendant Dr. Esparza for Summary Adjudication [CRC Rule 3.1350(C)(1)] - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to December 11, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

Defendant’s opposition documents appear to be incomplete, as Plaintiff’s reply references a  2-page opposition, a 9-page memorandum, and a 1-page proof of service that are not reflected in the Court’s file. In addition, Plaintiff’s reply appears to reference a version of the opposing declaration that includes 13 exhibits, but the declaration on file with the Court does not reference or contain any exhibits. Therefore, the hearing is CONTINUED and Defendant is instructed to submit an identical copy of all opposing documents that have been served on Plaintiff in this regard no later than Monday, November 25, 2024.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-24-002775 – MEDINA, LIBERTAD vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – a) Defendant General Motors LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – DENIED; b)Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [CCP 435, 436] – GRANTED.

a) The Court notes that Defendant’s Counsel did not engage in the required meet and confer after Plaintiff’s FAC was filed and prior to bringing this motion. (Civ. Proc. Code § 430.41)

The Court also notes that notes that Defendant’s demurrer notice to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities do not correspond and that the latter contains more grounds than in the Notice of Demurrer. A notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order. (CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.11100).

The purpose of the requirement that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought is to cause the moving party to sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.   Further, a basic tenet of motion practice is that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought, and courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion. ( Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268). However, the Court will consider Defendant’s arguments regarding the lack of a relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs

In general, a cause of action accrues when it is complete with all of its elements and a Statute of limitations on claims for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d) begins to run when plaintiff has information which would put reasonable person on inquiry notice. ( Vera v. REL-BC, LLC , (2021) 66 Cal. App. 5th 57). Plaintiff’s complaint does not plead any facts that suggest that Plaintiff was put on enquiry notice of the alleged defects with said vehicle on the date of purchase i.e. 5/29/20.   While Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Plaintiff took said vehicle for repairs to P’s engine at least 18 times from 5/22/20 till 10/4/23, the complaint does not provide enough information to fix a date certain for the running of the Statue of Limitations. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint states that she became aware of the factual basis of her complaint shortly before filing same.

Additionally, the running of said Statute of Limitations is not evident from the face of the Complaint. ( Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318; Donabedian v Mercury Insurance Co . (2004) 116 Cal. 4 ^th . 968, 994). Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes of action based on the Statute of Limitations is hereby overruled. ( Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318; Donabedian v Mercury Insurance Co . (2004) 116 Cal. 4 ^th . 968, 994).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state her cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants sold the vehicle at issue to Plaintiff with a full awareness of defects with the engine of said vehicle, and that said vehicle did not conform to the standards Defendant’s held the vehicle out to have. This cause of action is also supported by Plaintiff’s allegations that after multiple unsuccessful repairs to said vehicle by Defendant’s agents, it was represented to Plaintiff that said vehicle was operating as intended when it was not. ( Boschma v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., (2011)198 Cal. App. 4th 230 Dhital v Nissan North America, Inc, (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is overruledon this ground. 

Based on lowered pleading requirements of a Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state her CLRA cause of action. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California , (2018) 19 Cal. App. 5th 1234, as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 22, 2018). (See also Amiodarone Cases , (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 1091, 300 review denied (Jan. 25, 2023). Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is overruledon this ground. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff provided the required notice for her complaint herein ( Civ. Code § 1782(a); Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th1235; Benson v. S. California Auto Sales, Inc., (2015) 239 Cal. App. 4th 1198). Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action on this ground is hereby overruled.

b) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations in her First Amended complaint do not evidence the intent required to establish fraud, oppression or malice as would support a claim for punitive damages. (Civ. Proc. Code § 3294; Civ. Code § 1780(a)(4)).

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted. (Civ. Proc. Code § 435 (b)(1)).

Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages are accordingly strickenfrom her First Amended Complaint.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***